Dual-use in Asia-Pacific: where the demand is, and why so much of it goes unmet
Security rules in Asia-Pacific shape which companies may supply sensitive technologies, who may invest in them, and who may work on them. A young company selling into this demand, or an established company pivoting into it, must qualify, and that is where good technology stalls. This article sets out where the demand is, why so much of it goes unmet, and what the same rules mean for a founder, a company pivoting into the market, an investor, and a corporate partner or acquirer.
Key points
- A young company selling into this demand, or a company pivoting into it, must qualify under security rules; qualifying early can narrow the field of competitors.
- In four of six fields examined, demand extends beyond defence budgets, through civilian agencies, state-backed finance, and regulated operators.
- Good technology can stall when rules, budget holders, capital, and people are not reached at the same time.
- Public funding is expanding, but the exit examples here do not show a repeatable regional market.
- The same rules shape different decisions for a founder, a company pivoting into the market, an investor, and a corporate partner or acquirer.
Security rules in Asia-Pacific shape which companies may supply sensitive technologies, who may invest in them, and who may work on them. Demand for those technologies extends beyond defence budgets: in four of the six fields examined below, it comes wholly or partly through civilian agencies, state-backed finance, and regulated operators. A young company selling into this demand, or an established company pivoting into it, must qualify, and that is where good technology stalls.
Japan has awarded a ¥283.1bn contract for a satellite constellation, with startups among the partner companies. Regulators in Japan and Australia, among others, now require operators of critical infrastructure to account for their critical suppliers. The cost falls on companies whose technology works but that discover the rules too late. A sensor maker can sign an overseas distributor and only then learn that a component needs an export licence. A founder can take money from the first willing investor and find at exit that the investor’s origin narrows the field of likely buyers.
This article identifies where the demand is, what qualifying gives a company, why so much of the demand goes unmet, and what the same rules mean for a founder, a company pivoting into the market, an investor, and a corporate partner or acquirer.
A dual-use company, in this article, is one of any size that sells the same core technology to governments and to commercial customers, under export controls, investment screening, and procurement rules that reach the technology, the people who work on it, and the company’s owners and suppliers.
Where the demand is
Governments across the region have treated threats to space systems, undersea infrastructure, supply chains, and networks as matters of national security for more than a decade: China’s 2015 National Security Law, for example, extended its security interests to outer space, the seabed, and cyberspace. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy took the same broad view, and governments are now funding responses across many ministries.1 The examples below are a selection, chosen to show the range of that spending.
| Field | Demand driver or programme | Buyer or funding channel |
|---|---|---|
| Space and satellites | Japan: ¥283.1bn contract to build and run a satellite constellation (February 2026), awarded to Tri-Sat Constellation, a joint venture of Mitsubishi Electric, SKY Perfect JSAT, and Mitsui, with the startups Synspective, iQPS, and Axelspace taking part.2 | Ministry of Defense |
| Undersea systems | Australia: A$1.7bn to acquire a fleet of Ghost Shark uncrewed underwater vehicles, with a five-year contract with Anduril Australia for delivery, maintenance, and continued development (September 2025).3 | Royal Australian Navy |
| Supply chains and semiconductors | South Korea: Supply Chain Stabilisation Fund, raised to ₩10tn in 2025 from an initial ₩5tn in 2024, which finances companies securing key supplies.4 | State-guaranteed bonds, administered by the Export-Import Bank of Korea |
| Subsea cables and communications | Taiwan had designated all 25 of its subsea cables as critical infrastructure by February 2026 and is adding satellite backup.5 Singapore said in 2023 that it aims to double its capacity for subsea cable landings within ten years.6 | Digital ministries, regulators, and cable operators |
| Quantum communications | Singapore: nationwide quantum-safe networks for businesses under the National Quantum-Safe Network Plus, built by operators that Singapore’s digital regulator appointed in 2023.7 | Digital regulator and network operators |
| Cybersecurity | Singapore: 2024 amendments extend cybersecurity duties to critical infrastructure run by third parties, in force since October 2025, and provide for regulating major cloud and data-centre providers; a Digital Infrastructure Bill passed in October 2026 will also license them once in force. Japan: laws passed in 2025, whose key provisions took effect on 1 October 2026, require critical-infrastructure operators to report incidents and let the state disrupt attackers’ servers.8 | Civilian ministries and regulated operators themselves |
Figures are nominal and in local currency. They measure different things, so they are not added together.
What qualifying gives a company
Qualifying can give a company four things: two kinds of customer, demand that recurs, fewer competitors, and a way into the largest programmes.
Two kinds of customer. Commercial customers can give a dual-use company scale and earlier revenue; government contracts can give it long-term demand and credibility. Japan’s ACSL, for example, sells drones both to the Ministry of Defense and to infrastructure-inspection businesses.9
Demand that recurs. Some of that demand is required by law: regulated operators must keep meeting security duties for as long as they operate, so they keep needing suppliers who can help them. Designated Japanese operators in sectors including energy, telecoms, and finance must notify the government before installing critical equipment.10 Australia requires operators of critical infrastructure to run risk management programmes that cover supply chain hazards, and from June 2026 tightened them for energy, water, freight, and other asset classes, with compliance phased in to 2028.11 Australia’s Hosting Certification Framework sets which providers may host certain government data.12
Fewer competitors. Qualifying takes time and money, and because many companies cannot qualify in time, the requirement can narrow the field.
A way into the largest programmes. Governments often award their largest contracts to a group led by a large contractor, and young companies take part as members or subcontractors. In Japan’s satellite constellation, the startup Synspective holds a ¥105.6bn subcontract under the Tri-Sat joint venture.13
Why so much of it goes unmet
Good dual-use technology can fail to become a business, because the route from prototype to revenue runs through rules, budget holders, capital, and people, and a company must reach all four at the same time. Young companies feel this most, but a company pivoting in from commercial work meets the same four.
The rules are the first obstacle, and they reach a company long before it sells anything to a government: a component it buys, an engineer it hires, or an investor it accepts can each bring it within export controls, investment screening, or procurement rules. The consequences reach companies of every size, wherever they are based. In 2023 Seagate and its Singapore headquarters company agreed to pay a US$300m penalty to settle US allegations that they had sold Huawei hard drives made with US technology, in breach of US export controls.14 Australia ordered China-linked investors to sell their shares in the rare-earths company Northern Minerals in 2024, and again in May 2026, when six investors were told to sell about 17.6% of the company.15 Origin requirements also reach individual components: in August 2026 Taiwanese prosecutors opened what was reported as the first military drone procurement case under the National Security Act, alleging that false origin certificates had been used to hide Chinese-made parts.16
Budget holders are the second obstacle. A trial is often run by the people who would use the technology: a unit, a laboratory, or an innovation office judging whether it works. Production is paid for by someone else, who judges cost, support over the system’s life, accreditation, and fit with existing programmes, and who may put the order out to a fresh competition. A company that builds for the user who ran its trial can win the trial and still have nothing the budget holder is able to buy. Japan’s 2026 growth strategy sets out measures to move startups from trials into government procurement, a sign that the step is a known problem.17
Capital is the third. A 2026 survey reported a 0% target allocation to defence technology among the Asia-Pacific institutions it covered, against 4% in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and 3% in the Americas, and found the barriers to be sustainability mandates, illiquidity, and too few companies at scale. This describes the institutions surveyed, not all investment in the region.18 In Japan, the Minister of Defense said in May 2026 that venture funds backed by some government-affiliated lenders had been unable to invest in defence, and that the Development Bank of Japan had now lifted its restrictions on investing in businesses related to weapons.19
People are the fourth. In Australia, defence roles often require security clearances, permission to access controlled material, and eligibility under export-control rules as well as professional skill, and the nuclear submarine programme needs Australian citizens able to obtain high-level clearances.20 Japan’s military build-up faces recruitment limits as its population ages.21 For a young company, a foreign hire can raise export-control questions (see the founder’s position below), and the cleared engineers it needs are the same people the large contractors are recruiting.
The gap is therefore more than a shortage of money: the challenge is to put all four in place before the company runs out of time.
Exits and public money
The exit examples are illustrative, not evidence of a repeatable regional market. ServiceNow completed its US$7.75bn acquisition of Armis, which secures critical infrastructure for companies and governments, in April 2026, and the space-debris-removal company Astroscale listed on Tokyo’s growth market in June 2024 at an offer-price valuation of about US$630m.22 The larger of the two involved a buyer and a company from outside the region. Public funding is also growing: South Korea plans to enlarge its National Growth Fund to ₩200tn, Australia has sought proposals for venture capital funds in which it may consider co-investing up to A$500m in defence and dual-use companies, and Taiwan’s legislature authorised up to NT$240bn over six years for Taiwan-made drones in August 2026, with spending subject to annual budgets from 2027.23
Four decisions shaped by the same rules
The founder building a company. For a founder, the decision is how to build a company whose customers, investors, and team stay compatible as it grows. A first overseas sale can stall when a component or its software turns out to need an export licence. Hiring can require an export licence: under US rules, releasing controlled technology or source code to a foreign national, even inside the United States, generally counts as an export to that person’s most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency.24 The choice of first investors can narrow future customers and future buyers, as screening decisions such as the Northern Minerals orders illustrate.25 Where the company is incorporated and where its intellectual property sits can materially affect which governments treat it as a domestic supplier and who may later acquire it, and both are slow and costly to change.
The company pivoting into the market. For an established small or mid-sized company adding government and security customers to its commercial base, the decision is whether it can enter profitably without depending on one programme. Qualification comes first: accreditation carries fixed costs that weigh more on smaller firms, and government buying cycles often run longer than the supplier expects. Buyers check where components come from as well as the finished product, so a supplier may need its own evidence of where its parts are made. One way in is as a member or subcontractor in a consortium, which brings scale but also the lead contractor’s terms. The risk is dependence: a company that lets one government programme displace its commercial work becomes more exposed to a single buyer’s budget and priorities.
The fund backing a company. For an investor, the question is whether a company can turn this demand into durable revenue, finance its growth, and preserve credible routes to exit. That requires judging its access to customers and its ability to deliver, as well as what could restrict ownership, follow-on funding, or a sale. Screening reviews who may buy a company, and some infrastructure rules check who owns a supplier (Japan requires details of anyone directly holding 5% or more of a critical-equipment supplier’s voting rights), so the shareholder base a fund helps assemble shapes the list of eventual buyers.26 A portfolio company with commercial customers can have more possible buyers, because a commercial acquirer can buy it without needing a defence business of its own, though screening still applies. Government funding and long-term supply contracts can also carry consent rights and claims on intellectual property that surface only when a sale is negotiated.
The corporate partner or acquirer. For an established business, including a prime contractor, the first question is whether to build a capability itself, buy from a supplier, develop it with a partner, or acquire the company behind it. The rules help decide which routes are open and how much control each gives. A partner’s existing obligations can constrain the joint work, and sharing technology can be difficult to reverse. A target brings its technology and also its history: the licences it needs, the terms of any government funding, the consents owed to local partners, and the origin of its shareholders and components. Some of these restrict what the buyer may do with the business afterwards, and some cannot be undone once signed. A foreign acquirer is also screened itself, so the deal can turn on who the buyer is as much as on what the target does.
The sector’s boundaries move
Governments widen or narrow what they treat as security-relevant, and they sometimes relax rules that become too costly. In April 2025 the United States imposed a licence requirement on sales of Nvidia’s H20 AI chips to China, which halted them, and in August it began issuing those licences.27 A company can be set up correctly at founding and be blocked at its next funding round without changing anything itself, which is why a company needs to check its position again at each round, each new market, each change of supplier, and each sale.
Decisions to make early
How a company is financed affects whom it can serve; how it serves those customers affects who may later invest, partner, or buy. The failures in this article come down to a small set of questions that a dual-use company will typically be asked by an investor, a government, a customer, or a buyer, and the earlier it answers them, the more choices it keeps.
Tok Wei Sin is Founding Partner and Director of Meridian Strategic Group, which advises dual-use companies, their investors, and their partners across Asia-Pacific.
Footnotes
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Synspective (n 2). ↩
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ServiceNow, ‘ServiceNow completes Armis acquisition, closing the gap between asset visibility and cyber risk’ (20 April 2026) https://investor.servicenow.com/news/news-details/2026/ServiceNow-completes-Armis-acquisition-closing-the-gap-between-asset-visibility-and-cyber-risk/default.aspx; IPOX, ‘Astroscale Holdings Inc.’ (IPO calendar, June 2024) https://www.ipox.com/ipo-calendar/astroscale-holdings-inc both accessed 16 November 2026. ↩
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Reuters (n 15). ↩
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Cabinet Office (Japan) (n 10). ↩
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Bloomberg, ‘Nvidia, AMD to Resume AI Chip Sales to China in US Reversal’ (15 July 2025) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-15/nvidia-expects-license-to-sell-h20-ai-chip-to-china-again; Reuters, ‘US starts issuing licences to Nvidia to export H20 chips to China, official says’, South China Morning Post (9 August 2025) https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3321297/us-starts-issuing-licences-nvidia-export-h20-chips-china-official-says; Built In, ‘A Guide to How America Controls Nvidia Chip Exports to China’ https://builtin.com/articles/trump-lifts-ai-chip-ban-china all accessed 16 November 2026. ↩